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The last decade witnessed a proliferation in issues of sukuk, Islamic financial instruments structured 
to replicate the cash flows of conventional bonds. Using a market-based approach on Malaysian da-
ta, we consider whether investors react differently to the announcements of sukuk and conventional 
bond issues. Our findings suggest the stock market is neutral to announcements of conventional 
bond issues, but reacts negatively to announcements of sukuk issues. We attribute this finding to the 
excess demand for Islamic investment certificates and explain the difference in stock market reac-
tions as an adverse selection mechanism that favors sukuk issuance by lower-quality debtor compa-
nies. Unlike previous studies, our findings indicate markets readily distinguish between sukuk and 
conventional bonds. 
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Viime vuosikymmenellä ns. sukuk-velkakirjojen liikkeeseenlaskut  kasvoivat merkittävästi. Näillä 
velkakirjoilla tarkoitetaan islamilaisia rahoitusinstrumentteja, jotka muistuttavat rahavirtojen raken-
teeltaan tavanomaisia velkakirjoja. Markkinapohjaista menetelmää ja Malesiaa koskevaa aineistoa 
käyttäen tässä tutkimuksessa analysoidaan,  reagoivatko sijoittavat  eri tavoin  ilmoituksiin  sukuk-
velkakirjojen ja tavanomaisten velkakirjojen liikkeeseenlaskusta. Tulosten mukaan osakemarkkinat 
reagoivat neutraalisti ilmoituksiin tavanomaisten velkakirjojen liikkeeseenlaskusta, mutta negatiivi-
sesti ilmoituksiin sukuk-velkakirjojen liikkeeseenlaskusta. Tämän tuloksen selitetään johtuvan isla-
milaisten sijoitustodistusten ylikysynnästä. Osakemarkkinoiden erilaiset reaktiot johtuvat ns. adver-
se selection -mekanismista, joka johtaa siihen, että sukuk-velkakirjoja laskevat liikkeeseen taloudel-
lisesti huonompilaatuiset velallisyritykset. Aiemmista tutkimuksista poiketen vaikuttaa siltä, että 
markkinat tekevät selkeän eron sukuk-velkakirjojen ja tavanomaisten velkakirjojen välillä.  
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1  Introduction  
 
The past decade witnessed an unprecedented expansion in Islamic finance, including a notable wid-
ening of operations of Islamic banks and extensive issuance of sukuk, investment certificates that 
comply with Islam’s Shari’a legal code.
1 Recent figures indicate that Islamic banks operating in 
over 75 countries have total assets of about $300 billion and enjoy an annual growth rate exceeding 
15% (Chong and Liu, 2009). The Financial Times estimates the value of industry overall in excess 
of $1 trillion (Financial Times Special Report, 2010). Much of this expansion has been fuelled by 
sukuk issuance. Just as Islamic banks provide an alternative mode of financing compared to conven-
tional banking, sukuk are similar in structure to conventional bonds but allow sovereign and corpo-
rate entities to raise funds in capital markets in conformance with Shari’a principles. 
Islamic financial instruments were pioneered in the Far East (Malaysia and Indonesia) and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. The issuance of sukuk rose from $7.2 billion in 
2004 to $39 billion in 2007, with a global outstanding volume exceeding $90 billion (Jobst et al., 
2008). Sukuk today are also issued in other regions by sovereign, corporate, and international bodies 
such as the Saxony-Anhalt German State, GE Capital, and the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). Perhaps most striking is that European governments (including France and Britain) have 
taken legal steps to accommodate sukuk issues in their countries. Among the motivations for this 
development in countries outside the Muslim world, it is hard to overlook the eagerness of Western 
governments to attract funds from the GCC countries to finance sovereign and corporate debt. 
For sukuk to be Shari’a-compliant, three criteria must be met: 1) the certificates must rep-
resent ownership in tangible assets, usufruct or services of revenue-generating firms; 2) payments to 
investors should come from after-tax profits; and 3) the value repaid at maturity should reflect the 
current market price of the underlying asset − not the original amount invested. A debate was re-
cently  ignited  after  a  leading  Shari’a  scholar  announced  that  most  sukuk  do  not  comply  with 
Shari’a because they are in violation with at least one of the three principles, effectively making 
them no different than conventional bonds. Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007) and Wilson (2008) 
similarly contend that sukuk instruments do not constitute financial innovation as they are generally 
structured along Western rules of securitization. Cakir and Raei (2007) offer that counterargument 
that sukuk are in fact distinct from conventional bonds as they offer unique risk-reduction benefits 
when added to a portfolio of fixed income securities. 
                                                 
1 See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Merrouche (2010) for a broad analysis of Islamic banks. Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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This study goes to the heart of the debate over whether sukuk are financing instruments 
that mirror conventional bonds or have a distinct character. Here, we examine how a stock market 
reacts to sukuk and conventional bond issues by corporate entities to provide a comparative analy-
sis. 
Our approach appraises sukuk from two perspectives. First, putting aside theoretical and 
structural  differences  and  similarities  (including  the  views  of  Shari-a  scholars),  we  ask  simply 
whether stock market participants themselves distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds. 
We address market-based evidence on differences in company stock returns following issue an-
nouncements by applying an event methodology to examine whether announcements of sukuk and 
conventional bond issues lead to significant abnormal returns for the issuers. We then perform a 
market perception analysis on investor valuations of sukuk for insights into their future prospects. 
While the issuance of sukuk is ostensibly motivated by religious principles, we ask whether extrin-
sic factors such as access to a new class of investors might also be involved. 
Our study is topical in light of the recent expansion of sukuk. Determining whether inves-
tor valuation of sukuk is better or worse in comparison to conventional bonds, would allow us to 
project an optimistic or pessimistic view of the expansion of sukuk markets. This work broadens a 
fairly thin body of research on these still novel securities. Existing work on the emergence of sukuk 
appears in the context of overviews of  Islamic finance (e.g. Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007; Visser, 
2009), and few studies investigate their evolution or specific characteristics (e.g. Jobst, 2007; Jobst 
et al., 2008). 
To analyze the stock market reaction to sukuk and conventional bond issuance, we consider 
a sample of Malaysian-listed companies that issued both conventional bonds and sukuk during the 
period 2002−2009. For our purposes, Malaysia is ideal as it is by far the most active in terms of 
corporate sukuk issues. The volume of sukuk issued in Malaysia alone in 2007 was $28.1 billion, 
compared to $19 billion for all GCC countries  (Ernst & Young, 2009).  Furthermore, Malaysia 
dominates the global corporate sukuk market with 75% share of total corporate sukuk over the pe-
riod January 2004−June 2007. In contrast, most GCC sukuk are sovereigns; there is no active sec-
ondary market as most issues are usually held to maturity.
2 Malaysian sukuk are also valuable for 
the purposes of this study as they represent about half of the total stock of Malaysian corporate 
bonds (Jobst et al., 2008), i.e. they are not limited to a small portion of the disintermediated financ-
ing for companies. 
                                                 
2 Similarly, corporate bond issues in the GCC region are quite limited and there is no active debt market in the region. 
This precludes extending our event analysis to cover this part of the world.  
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By way of preview, we find that there is an insignificant stock market reaction to conven-
tional bond issuance and a negative reaction to sukuk announcements. We also report that there are 
significant differences in abnormal returns following the issuance of bonds and sukuk. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide an overview 
of sukuk and a literature survey. We present our empirical design in section 3, and discuss our find-
ings in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2   An overview of sukuk 
 
This section starts with a discussion of what distinguishes sukuk from conventional bonds and re-
cent market developments. We review the prospects and challenges facing sukuk, and conclude by 
addressing our main research question as to whether markets see sukuk as distinct from conven-
tional bonds. 
 
2.1.    What are sukuk? 
 
The new millennium opened with Islamic capital markets embracing Shari’a-compliant financial 
instruments known as sukuk.
3 Sukuk investments represent a distinct class of securities issued by 
sovereign and corporate entities. They are investment certificates with both bond and stock-like fea-
tures issued to finance trade or the production of tangible assets. Like bonds, sukuk have a maturity 
date and holders are entitled to a regular stream of income over the life of the sukuk along with a 
final balloon payment at maturity. However, sukuk are asset-based rather than asset-backed securi-
ties, with the underlying asset being necessarily Shari’a-compliant in both nature and use. The eli-
gibility of sukuk rests on identifying an existing or a well-defined asset, service, or project capable 
of being certified by a third party, and for which ownership can be recorded in some form. Sukuk 
holders might be responsible for asset-related expenses, and the sale of sukuk results in the sale of a 
share of an asset. Bonds, in contrast, are pure debt obligations issued to finance any activity and 
whose value rests on the creditworthiness of the issuer. Sukuk prices can vary both with the credit-
worthiness of the issuer and the market value of the underlying asset. However, while sukuk and 
                                                 
3 The Arabic term sukuk is a plural form of Sakk, which derives from a Persian term meaning “to strike one’s seal on a 
document” (McMillen, 2007). Adam (2006) notes that the term was introduced in Medieval Europe, eventually becom-
ing our modern word “Cheque.” Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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shares of stock are similar in the sense that they represent ownership claims and that the return on 
both investments is not guaranteed, Sukuk must be related to a specific asset, service or project for a 
period of time. Equity shares, of course, represent ownership claims on the whole company with no 
maturity date. 
In May 2003, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) officially defined sukuk in the Standard for Investment Sukuk as certificates of equal 
value representing undivided shares in ownership of tangible assets, usufruct and services, and it 
identified at least fourteen possible sukuk structures. The AAOIFI Standard distinguishes sukuk 
from stocks, bonds, and from the conventional process of securitization as well, emphasizing that 
sukuk are not debt certificates with a financial claim to cash flow and that they may not be issued on 
a pool of receivables. Rather, they are similar to a trust certificate with proportional or undivided 
interest in an asset or a pool of assets, and the right to a proportionate share of cash flow is derived 
from ownership interest that carries risks and benefits. 
Sukuk can denote partial ownership in a debt, asset, project, business, or investment: i.e. 
Murabaha (cost-plus sales), Salam (pre-payment of an asset for future delivery), Ijara (rental/ lease 
agreement), Istisna (build-to-own property), and Mudaraba and Musharaka (partnership forms).
4 
Most offerings to date are Ijara or asset-based, with some recent innovations taking place in the 
structuring and pricing of Musharaka Sukuk (Abdel-Khaleq and Richardson, 2007; Wilson, 2008). 
Appendixes 1 and 2 present diagrams to illustrate Ijara and Musharaka Sukuk structures, respec-
tively. 
In a typical Ijara Sukuk structure, the originator sells assets to the sukuk issuer, a bank-
ruptcy-remote special purpose vehicle (SPV) created to act as a trustee for investors acquiring the 
assets (Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2007).
5 The assets are then leased back to the sukuk issuer for a stated 
period, with the agreement to sell the asset back to the lessee at the end of the lease period.
6 At the 
same time, the SPV issues certificates of participation to investors representing undivided owner-
ship in the underlying asset. Over the term of the lease contract, the trustee receives rental payments 
                                                 
4 Murabaha, Salam, and Istisna Sukuk certificates are not readily tradable on the secondary market due to Shari’a re-
strictions (Usmani, 2002).  
5 Shari’a scholars agree that ownership of an asset is possible with proper documentation, even if the title is not regis-
tered under the buyer's name. The common practice is to transfer beneficial title (not legal title of ownership) to avoid 
transfer taxes and other unfavorable costs. The sole exception is the case of Qatar global sukuk, whereby land title is 
actually transferred to the SPV. 
6 It should be noted that there are Shari’a restrictions to executing a contract of sale of the leased assets at a future date 
at the time of initiating the Ijara agreement. The sale/purchase deal is not an integral part of the Ijara agreement and 
can only be executed at the time of transferring back the assets from the lessor to the lessee. Alternatively, an initial 
sale/purchase undertaking can be entered into, allowing the lessee to ultimately purchase back the assets. Such an un-
dertaking is not a contract and is only binding on the undertaker while the other party has the option not to proceed. It is 
only signed after completing the initial sale agreement relating to the assets.  
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for the use of the asset and distributes them to certificate holders in proportion to their ownership 
stake.
7 Upon expiry of the lease contract, the sukuk holder’s ownership claims cease and the pay-
ment flow halts. The principal is returned to the holder and asset ownership reverts to the lessee. If 
the asset has a market value, the sukuk holder can realize a capital gain or loss. However, if the un-
derlying is a public good for which there is no market, the sukuk holder exercises an embedded put 
option whereby the originator buys back the underlying assets at face value.  
Alternatively, in a Musharaka Sukuk structure, the two parties include an originator provid-
ing a pool of assets and an SPV which raises cash by selling sukuk notes to investors (Abdulkader 
and Nathif, 2004). These parties enter into a Musharaka (partnership) arrangement for a fixed pe-
riod and agree on profit- and loss-sharing ratios. The issuer also undertakes to buy the Musharaka 
shares of the SPV on a periodic basis. The two partners then appoint a managing agent (usually the 
originator) to act on behalf of the Musharaka, and to develop or make efficient use of the asset(s). 
In return, the agent gets a fixed agency fee and a variable incentive fee payable. The cash returns 
generated from the Musharaka are paid as profits to the Sukuk investors. At the end of the fixed 
Musharaka period, the issuer would have bought back the Musharaka shares at pre-agreed prices 
and  intervals,  and  the  SPV  no  longer  has  any  shares  in  the  partnership.  Partnership  contracts 
through Musharaka Sukuk strengthen the paradigm of Islamic finance and are preferred from the 
viewpoint of jurists because they rest on profit-and-loss arrangements. The returns on such partici-
pation certificates are contingent on the company fundamentals and not benchmarked to market 
rates. They are also attractive to investors because they are negotiable instruments that can be traded 
in the presence of an active secondary market. 
 
2.2     A brief history of sukuk 
 
Although sukuk were first issued in the 1980s, nearly all growth has come within the past decade. 
According to Moody’s (2007, 2008), the global outstanding volume of sukuk exceeded $90 billion 
in 2007 and at that time expected to reach $200 billion by 2010. Issuance quadrupled from $7.2 bil-
lion in 2004 to nearly $39 billion by the end of 2007, and was up from $336 million in 2000. Table 
1 shows the distribution of sukuk across corporate and sovereign issues over the period 2000-2007. 
                                                 
7 Most Ijara Sukuk pay a predetermined rate of return to investors. Variable rate sukuk linked to an agreed upon pricing 
benchmark, usually the LIBOR, may be issued under a Master Lease Agreement. Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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Table 1 indicates that corporate sukuk quickly gained a dominant market share in the Is-
lamic banking world, reaching more than 94% in 2005. Corporate sukuk broaden the firm’s financ-
ing base away from traditional sources of fund (such as bank loans and lines of credit that are saved 
for other strategic investments), and extend their maturity beyond the short-term horizon usually 
granted by banks. Further, corporate sukuk issues increase public recognition of the company and 
raise its profile in the market. 
As noted above, Malaysia dominates the sukuk market, accounting for approximately 75% 
of total issues even with the mega-deals of the past two years that have established Dubai Interna-
tional Financial Exchange (DIFX)’s position as global sukuk center, with eight listings exceeding 
$10 billion as of June 2007 (DIFC, 2007).
8, 9 Thanks to a special provision for non-profit trusts 
similar to English law, Malaysian law has played a significant role in developing the market for su-
kuk (Wilson, 2008). Malaysia’s legal framework facilitates the establishment of the SPVs required 
for all sukuk to hold title of the underlying securitized assets and administer payments to investors.
10 
Given this favorable legal environment, sukuk issues proliferated in Malaysia and a secondary mar-
ket that is much more active than in the GCC region developed there.
11 For the purposes of our 
study, therefore, we concentrate on sukuk from Bursa Malaysia. Figures 1 and 2 document the ex-
pansion of sukuk in Malaysia over the past decade. 
At the international level, London seeks to retain its role in provision of Islamic financial 
services, signaling its intention with specific language in the UK Finance Bill 2007 (Miller, Chal-
loner, and Atta, 2007). The legislation was designed to give sukuk a level playing field with conven-
tional securitization formats by providing tax treatment equivalent to similar financial products. 
In late 2009, two issues marked a widening in the recognition and acceptance of sukuk out-
side the Islamic world (Parker, 2010b). The first issue was the much-oversubscribed 5-year Aaa-
rated $100m sukuk of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which was jointly arranged by 
HSBC, Dubai Islamic Bank and Kuwait Finance House-Bahrain. It was designed to increase fund-
ing for development activities in emerging markets, including the MENA region. Although small 
                                                 
8 The GCC mega-issues of sukuk include the 2004 Department of Civil Aviation of UAE issue for $750 million to fund 
the expansion of the Dubai International Airport, the 2006 sukuk by Dubai Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation 
for $3.5 billion, the 2006 Abu Dhabi Aabar Petroleum oil exploration and production fully convertible sukuk for $460 
million, the 2006 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank $800 million floating rate Islamic note which secured ratings from Fitch 
Ratings and Moody’s, and the 2006 Nakheel Group record of $3.52bn unrated sukuk with unique IPO rights. 
9 As of December 2009, Bursa Malaysia took the lead in terms of total sukuk value which exceeds $17.6 billion for 12 
issues, followed by DIFX ($15.7 billion), London (£6.5 billion), Luxembourg ($7.3 billion), and Bahrain ($2.18 billion 
and BD330 million) (Parker, 2010a). 
10 According to Wilson (2008), lead sukuk managers include Citigroup. HSBC, Standard Chartered, and Deutsche Bank. 
11 Wilson (2008) posits that Malaysian sukuk could provide an alternative tool for Islamic banks to manage liquidity 
problems, say, going to London Metal Exchange to buy/sell commodities on a Murabaha basis.  
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relative to mega-sukuk issues, it demonstrated that leading international institutions such as the 
World Bank acknowledge the importance of sukuk as a financing tool. The second issue was US-
based GE Capital’s 5-year $500 million sukuk to raise money for general corporate and balance 
sheet purposes. This “toe-in-the-water” transaction was seen as strategically important for GE as it 
raised funds from a new and important investor base. 
 
2.3    Are sukuk that different from conventional bonds? 
 
The recent controversy over whether some sukuk actually comply with the precepts of Shari’a sug-
gests that sukuk are generally structured along Western rules of asset securitization. This raises the 
question of whether these innovative financial instruments are really all that different from conven-
tional bonds. According to Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007), sukuk are structured to ensure an 
equivalent return to a conventional bond, with the difference that the return on the sukuk is gener-
ated from an underlying asset, not from the obligation to pay interest. Similarly, Wilson (2008) ar-
gues that financiers make special efforts to render sukuk identical to conventional securities so un-
familiar investors can assess the risk of these new investments. Such sukuk essentially mirror con-
ventional securities, defeating the notion of product innovation coupled with distinctive and pricing-
risk characteristics in the Islamic finance industry. 
Shari’a scholars oppose the structuring of Islamic financial instruments to please interna-
tional investors precisely because of this danger of making them conventional interest-based prod-
ucts. They dismiss the need for similarity with conventional bonds to bridge the gap between con-
ventional capital markets and emerging Islamic securities markets to strengthen global financial in-
tegration. According to the President of the AAOIFI Shari’a Council, Mohammad Taqi Usmani, 
current practices of issuing Sukuk replicate the structure of conventional bonds in terms of lack of 
ownership, right to a fixed return, and the guarantee of repayment of principal. Usmani (2007) ar-
gues against seeking international bond ratings, since sukuk can be rated by the recently established 
regional ratings agency, if needed, and Islamic banks should stand ready to endorse the acceptabil-
ity of sukuk. 
Cakir and Raei (2007) take an opposing view, suggesting that Sukuk are truly different 
from conventional bonds. The authors examine the risk-reduction advantages of issuing sovereign 
sukuk as alternative financing instruments compared to conventional sovereign bonds. Using a sam-
ple of sovereign sukuk and eurobonds from the same issuer, the authors estimate and compare Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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value-at-risk (VaR) for a portfolio that includes both instruments to a pure eurobond portfolio. They 
find that the VaR is reduced when sukuk are added to the portfolio of fixed-income securities, dem-
onstrating that these investment certificates create diversification benefits for investors. 
  For our purposes, we can forego the larger debate and ask whether the market itself 
perceives a difference between a sample of actively traded sukuk and bond instruments in Malaysia. 
 
 
3  Empirical design 
 
In this section, we provide a description of the data and relevant descriptive statistics, followed by 
an explanation of the methodology and presentation of the results. 
 
3.1  Data and summary statistics 
 
The sample of issues of sukuk and conventional bonds comes from Bloomberg, and  spans 2002 to 
2009. The sample size is determined by information availability on all requested variables, notably 
closing stock prices for companies issuing debt for a time span long enough before the announce-
ment date of the issue in order to apply the market model and compute abnormal returns. Our final 
sample comprises 170 issues (77 sukuk and 93 conventional bonds). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on our sample of securities classified by issue type. 
On average, the conventional bond issues are considerably larger (314 million ringgit) than the su-
kuk (96 million ringgit).
12 The maturity is, on average, twice longer for conventional bonds than for 
sukuk (six-and-a-half years versus three-and-a-half years, respectively). The shorter maturity of su-
kuk could suggest that these financial instruments pay lower total returns in terms of both current 
yield and capital gains yield. However, the descriptive statistics show that the average coupon rate 
on sukuk is higher than for conventional bonds (4.06% versus 3.79%), and that Islamic securities in 
Malaysia are issued at a deeper discount compared to conventional debt instruments (97.94% versus 
99.17% of par) thereby offering greater potential for capital appreciation. These preliminary obser-
vations are interesting in the sense that higher promised returns on sukuk could be associated with 
higher investment risk, notwithstanding their shorter maturity. It also suggests that sukuk issuers are 
                                                 
12  Approximately $92 million and $28 million at the current exchange rate.  
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keen on offering greater return incentives to purchase their securities, who are unwilling to commit 
their funds for long periods. 
To shed light on the nature and characteristics of different issuers of conventional bonds 
and sukuk, Table 3 provides descriptive statistics by issuer for each security. We find that compa-
nies issuing sukuk tend to be smaller than conventional bond issuers, both in terms of balance sheet 
assets and market valuation. These firms are also more indebted and exposed to greater financial 
risk. Sukuk issuers are less capitalized with an average equity-to-assets ratio below 20%, or half of 
the  average  40%  equity-to-assets  ratio  of  conventional  bonds  issuers.  Debt  ratios  are  similarly 
higher than those of conventional bonds issuers. The long-term debt-to-assets ratio of companies 
issuing sukuk approaches 30%, while firms borrowing in the conventional market average around 
20%. In normal economic conditions, greater financial risk likely translates into higher profitability 
levels. All profitability ratios listed in Table 3 indicate that they are worse for firms issuing sukuk 
compared to companies raising funds through conventional bonds. Indeed, the operating margins 
and ROA are negative for companies issuing sukuk, suggesting greater operating risk on top of their 
already heightened financial risk. In a nutshell, these observations point to a better financial and op-
erating position for companies issuing conventional bonds that those engaging in sukuk issues, and 
that the shorter maturities and lower average amount of sukuk issues reflect lower-quality borrow-
ers.  
Sukuk issuers issued about double the average number of investment certificates (6.63 is-
sues) than conventional bond issuers (3.10 issues). This finding comports with the fact that sukuk, 
because they tend to be smaller and have shorter maturities, require more issues. 
 
3.2  Methodology and findings 
 
Following the literature, we use a standard market model to estimate abnormal returns around the 
event date for a security issue.
13 Our sample period (2002−2009) contains 93 events for conven-
tional bonds and 77 events for sukuk. The date of announcement is treated as day 0. We estimate 
market model parameters over the period (-100, -10). This filter reduces the sample size to compa-
nies that have at least 100 days of stock returns observations. Using larger estimation periods (150 
trading days) and stopping the estimation period up to 30 days before the event date has no affect on 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, Lummer and McConnell (1989); Preece and Mullineaux (1996); and Gasbarro et al. (2004). MacK-
inlay (1997) provides an excellent survey on event studies methods. Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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our results. We define returns as [P(t)-P(t-1)]/P(t-1), where P is the stock market daily price at clos-
ing. We use several Malaysian stock indices (FBM 100, FBMKLCI, FBMEMAS, FBMS), and all 
give similar findings.
14 In the tables below, we show the results pertaining to the stock index giving 
the largest R² for the market model regression (or FBMEMAS). 
We examine one-day [0,0], three-day [−1,+1] and five-day [−2,+2] event windows and 
calculate average abnormal daily returns (non-standardized and standardized). We obtain cumula-
tive average abnormal returns (CAARs) by summing daily excess returns over the respective event 
windows, and  use standard OLS regressions estimate the market model with an average R² (not re-
ported) close to 20% for all estimations. 
We incorporate two asymmetric four-day event windows, i.e. [-1,2] and [-2,1]. Financial 
markets in  emerging economies are not  expected to be  as efficient  as those in more advanced 
economies, so we expect there could be a leakage of information when new securities are issued. As 
such, it is possible that abnormal returns are realized prior to the announcement date.  
We perform t-tests to investigate the statistical significance of CAARs and standardized 
CAARs.
15 To investigate if the stock market discriminates between the type of investment certifi-
cate event (sukuk or conventional bond issuance), we apply Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis 
tests to the CAARs and standardized CAARs by debt type. 
Table 4 displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of security issue (sukuk or con-
ventional bonds). The percentage of positive CAARs appears in the fourth column, while the last 
two columns provide p-values for t-tests of CAARs significance. Across all event windows, we 
note that all computed CAARs are positive for conventional bonds and negative for sukuk, despite 
lack of significance over the [0,0] and [-1,1] windows of returns. The CAARs and standardized 
CAARs of sukuk issues, however, are negative and significantly different from 0 for the largest 
event window [-2,2] and for the asymmetric event windows [-2,1] and [-1,2].
16 Further, the percent-
age of positive sukuk CAARs is lower than the corresponding ratio for conventional bonds for all 
windows with the exception of the smallest, and it decreases as the event window widens, whereas 
the percentage of positive conventional bonds CAARs rises with larger event windows. 
                                                 
14 FBM 100: FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index is a capitalization-weighted index comprised of the top 100 large- 
and mid-cap companies on the Bursa Malaysia Main Board. FBMKLCI: FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Index comprises 
of the largest 30 companies by full market capitalization on the Bursa Malaysia Main Board. FBMEMAS: FTSE Bursa 
Malaysia EMAS Index is a capitalization-weighted index comprised of large- and mid-cap constituents of the FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia 100 Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small Cap Index.  FBMS: FTSE Bursa Malaysia EMAS 
Shariah index is a market-capitalization weighted index that incorporates the large- and mid-cap stocks of the FTSE 
Bursa Malaysia 100 Index and the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Small Cap Index. 
15 We standardize CAARs using the square root of the product of the number of days in the event window and the mean 
square error. 
16 We also use Patell (1976), Boehmer et al. (1991), and cross-sectional t-statistics and obtain similar findings.  
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Table 5 displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the differ-
ence of CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of issue (sukuk versus conventional bonds). For 
the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs (respectively standardized 
CAARs) between sukuk and conventional bond issues’ events is null. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
the null hypothesis is that the samples for sukuk and conventional bond issue events come from 
identical populations. CAAR and standardized CAAR variances are unequal according to Fisher 
tests, so we use the Satterthwaite method for the Student tests. Student approximation gives similar 
results to normal approximation for Wilcoxon tests. We display the normal approximation (Z-score) 
for this test. 
We note that the Student and Wilcoxon tests allow rejecting the null hypotheses for stan-
dardized CAAR over the largest event window [-2,2] and the asymmetric event window [-2,1] at 
the 10% confidence level, i.e. the difference between the CAARs of sukuk and bonds is not zero. In 
other words, abnormal returns are different for sukuk and conventional bond issues or, stated differ-
ently, the market does not react in a similar manner to these two types of issues and is capable of 
discriminating between them. This result reinforces our previous finding of a negative market reac-
tion to sukuk issues in Table 4. 
We test the robustness of our results by using a different market model. In our sample, 
companies that issue conventional bonds do not issue sukuk, and those that issue sukuk do not issue 
conventional bonds. Since our sample exhibits market segmentation, it may be inappropriate to use 
the same market model for both types of companies.
17 From this perspective, stock returns for com-
panies issuing different types of securities may be sensitive to different stock market indices. To 
address this, we perform two separate regressions to compute normal returns for companies issuing 
each type of security. The first uses the FBMEMAS index as a proxy of market return for compa-
nies issuing conventional bonds, and the second employs the FBMS Islamic index as a proxy for 
market return for companies issuing sukuk.
18 The rest of the methodology is exactly the same as de-
scribed  in  sub-section  3.2.
19  We  display  the  results  using  different  market  models  in  Tables  6 
                                                 
17 The average betas for companies issuing conventional bonds and sukuk are equal to 1.21 and 1.11, respectively, when 
employing the same market model with the FBMEMAS index to proxy for market return. Using a t-test, we cannot re-
ject the null hypothesis of betas equality.  
18 The R² for the market model regression using the FBMS index equals 15.46%. It is slightly lower than for the market 
model with FBMEMAS index (18.47%). 
19 One alternative is to apply Asset Pricing Theory and estimate normal returns using a Fama-French multi-factor mod-
el. We ruled out this approach for two reasons. First, recent evidence indicates that event study results are weakly sensi-
tive to the type of specification used to compute returns and that simple models are more appropriate (Ahern, 2009). Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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(CAARs  and  standardized  CAARs  by  type  of  security  issue)  and  7  (Student,  Wilcoxon  and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs by issue type). We ob-
serve that changing the market model specification does not alter our main findings, again finding 
that stock market reaction is negative and significant for sukuk over the largest event window [-2,2] 
and the asymmetric event windows. We also note that, for this event window and the asymmetric 
event window [-2,1], the stock market reaction differs following the type of security issued, con-
firming that investors have a different perception of conventional bonds and sukuk issues.
20 
These additional robustness checks confirm and thus reinforce our earlier results. Overall, 
the Malaysian stock market is capable of distinguishing sukuk from conventional bond issues and 
stock market reaction is negative for sukuk issues. 
 
 
4  Discussion 
 
Our empirical results yield three insights related to sukuk and conventional bond issues: 1) the ab-
sence of significant stock-market reaction to conventional bond announcements, 2) the negative re-
action to sukuk issues, and, 3) as a corollary, the significant difference in stock market reactions to 
sukuk and conventional bond issues. 
The first finding of an absence of significant reaction of stock markets to conventional 
bond announcements is not at odds with former literature, which includes studies providing evi-
dence that stock markets do not react to debt announcements including bond issuances (Eckbo, 
1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986), even if some find support for a negative reaction (Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves, 1999). The reaction of stock markets to the issue of bonds is influenced by oppos-
ing effects. Debt issuance may send a credible signal about the quality of firms, helping solve the 
adverse selection problem that results from information asymmetries between firm insiders and out-
siders, and thus leading to a positive stock market reaction (Ross, 1977). It can also reduce moral 
hazard behavior and agency costs resulting from conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, stock markets could react negatively to debt issue 
events because greater debt may contribute to increasing moral hazard behavior under two scenar-
ios. First, debt enhances the bankruptcy risk of the borrower, (since bankruptcy is associated with 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Second, the implementation of a multi-factor model requires information about company characteristics only available 
in limited cases. This would have drastically reduced the scope of our investigation. 
20 We obtain similar findings using two asymmetric event windows and two different market model specifications.  
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the failure to repay due debt commitments); and second, debt increases the agency costs resulting 
from the conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Against this background, we interpret the absence of significant reaction to conventional 
bond  announcements  in  the  Malaysian  stock  exchange  as  the  result  of  these  opposing  effects, 
which, again, is in line with findings of former studies. 
However, we find a significant difference in stock market reaction to sukuk and conven-
tional bond issues, following the negative reaction to sukuk issues compared to the insignificant re-
action to conventional bond issues. 
We suggest two explanations for this. Following the adverse selection argument, we pro-
pose that only borrowers with the lowest return expectations have an incentive to prefer sukuk. 
Here, borrowers can choose between interest-based (conventional bonds) and profit-and-loss shar-
ing (Sukuk) securities. If entrepreneurs expect a low profit, they prefer profit-and-loss sharing fi-
nancing schemes to minimize their loss in the likely event of failure. If entrepreneurs expect a high 
profit, they prefer interest-based financing to maximize their gain in the likely event of success. As 
a result, stock market participants will expect the worst borrowers to choose to issue sukuk and will 
interpret such issuance as a negative signal on the financial position of the issuing firm. 
Kuran (2004) provides a similar argument to explain why many Islamic banks do not sup-
ply  more  equity-like  financing  instruments  in  line  with  the  profit-and-loss  sharing  principle 
(Musharaka and Mudaraba) and in comparison with debt-based financing instruments. Since Is-
lamic banks coexist with conventional banks in most countries, they are likely to face adverse selec-
tion problems if they only propose equity-like financing instruments. Borrowers with low expecta-
tions might opt for these instruments whereas those with high expectations will deal with conven-
tional banks.
21 
As a second explanation, we propose that our finding could result from the excess demand 
for sukuk from Islamic banks. All banks (conventional and Islamic) have incentives to hold a port-
folio of investment assets as they are more liquid than loans and yield a higher return than interbank 
loans. However, the liquidity needs of Islamic banks are accentuated by the lack of acceptable 
means to deal with the asset- liability mismatch inherent in banking operations. Islamic banks can-
                                                 
21 “By allowing entrepreneurs to choose between interest and profit and loss sharing, conventional banks create an ad-
verse selection problem for the Islamic banks: entrepreneurs with below-average profit expectations prefer profit and 
loss sharing in order to minimize their losses in the likely event of failure, while those with above-average expectations 
prefer interest in order to maximize their gains in the likely event of success. The upshot is that the Islamic banks re-
ceive a disproportionately large share of the bad risks.” (Kuran, 2004, p.12) Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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not borrow in the interbank market or at the central bank’s discount window because such transac-
tions involve the payment of interest. As Wilson (2004) argues, the vast majority of sukuk is held by 
Islamic banks because these financial instruments represent the backbone for the development of a 
much needed secondary Islamic capital market.  
As a consequence, the existence of a strong demand for sukuk from Islamic banks associ-
ated with the limited supply of sukuk on the market leads to an excess demand for sukuk that makes 
these instruments easier to sell than conventional bonds. Thus, companies that are weak financially 
and unable to issue a conventional bond might still have access to financing through sukuk. Since 
the market anticipates this, it does not react positively to the issuance of sukuk. Furthermore, com-
panies that are in good standing know that firms in bad shape must issue sukuk as they have been 
shut out of the conventional bond market. As a result, they have an incentive to prefer the issuance 
of conventional bonds to avoid sending a negative signal about their own quality. 
Both interpretations of our findings are supported empirically by differences in the charac-
teristics of the issuers of the two categories of securities. Companies issuing sukuk are typically in 
worse financial shape than those issuing conventional bonds, i.e.  more leveraged and less profit-
able. These weaker companies can well have economic incentives to prefer issuing a security based 
on a profit-and-loss sharing principle rather than a fixed-income instrument that imposes a greater 
financial burden, and they may be shut out of the conventional bond market. 
To determine whether it is the financial instrument or the financial situation of sukuk-
issuing firms that ultimately contribute to the negative abnormal returns, we make an additional 
analysis. Thus, while we claim issuing sukuk leads to the negative market reaction, one could make 
the alternative argument that the weak financial characteristics of sukuk-issuing firms is what leads 
to the negative abnormal return. In that case, the instrument plays no signaling role as the stock 
market is capable of distinguishing among issuers according to their financial health within the su-
kuk category of financial instruments. 
To investigate if the instrument matters for the adverse selection mechanism, we split our 
sample of sukuk-issuing firms in two subsamples according to the quality of the issuer and test the 
differences in abnormal returns for good and bad issuers. 
If the instrument matters, we would expect to observe no significant difference in abnormal 
returns among issuers as all sukuk-issuing firms are similarly affected by the issuance of sukuk. 
Conversely, if the financial situation is what matters, we should observe a significant difference in 
abnormal returns between good and bad sukuk issuers.  
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For these additional tests, only event windows for which our initial CAAR and standard-
ized CAAR results were significant are used (i.e. [-2,2], [-2,1], [-1,2]). We only report results for 
the [-2,2] event windows for space reasons, but the results are similar with both other event win-
dows. We consider five different financial ratios (equity to total assets, total debt to total assets, 
EBIT to total interest expenses, current ratio, operating margin, return on assets) to capture sol-
vency, profitability, and liquidity characteristics of the issuer. We then split the sample according to 
the median of each ratio to create two subsamples of sukuk issuers (financially healthy and un-
healthy) 
Table 8 displays the results of the tests of significance for the difference of CAARs and 
standardized CAARs according to the financial situation of the issuer. Overall, we find no signifi-
cant difference in abnormal returns between sukuk-issuing firms in good financial shape and those 
in bad shape. This finding suggests that the market cannot discriminate issuer quality within the su-
kuk financial instrument category. 
As a consequence, these findings strengthen the view that the sign of the abnormal returns 
observed for sukuk-issuing firms are driven by the financial instrument category, and confirm the 
role of sukuk issuance as a negative signal for the market. 
Our major conclusion regarding the negative market reaction to sukuk issues in comparison 
with insignificant reaction to conventional bond issues has several implications. First, the fact that 
stock market investors are able to distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds supports the 
view of Cakir and Raei (2007) that sukuk are indeed distinct from conventional bonds, and tends to 
undermine the arguments of Wilson (2008) and Miller, Challoner, and Atta (2007). Although sukuk 
are similar in structure to conventional bonds (Usmani, 2007), stock market participants perceive 
these instruments as special and react differently to their issuance. 
A second implication relates to the evolution of sukuk and the predictions of strong growth 
of this market. While there may well be a variety of motivations for firms to issue sukuk, including 
religious factors, our analysis suggests a valid financial explanation. The fact that stock markets 
negatively perceive sukuk should deter healthy firms from the use of these securities as negative 
stock returns following a sukuk issuance could be detrimental to firm value, at least in the short run. 
This would limit shareholder incentives to issue these investment certificates unless they know that 
they have no other access to financing. 
The third implication concerns the economic effects of the expansion of sukuk on Islamic 
banks. Shari’a-compliant financial institutions hold sukuk on their balance sheet as liquidity man-Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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agement tools in the same way that conventional banks invest in fixed income securities. However, 
the industry suffers from the absence of a secondary market for trading sukuk, which prior literature 
has attributed to insufficient supply. If negative stock returns correlate with lower sukuk prices, the 
absence of sukuk trading may stem from a reluctance to post losses on these instruments. It is also 
possible that the negative market perception registered for sukuk issues might erode the image of the 
holders (i.e. Islamic banks) as well. 
 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
Using event study methodology on a sample of Malaysian public companies, this paper analyzed 
stock market reactions to announcements of sukuk and conventional bond issues. Our findings sup-
port the view that stock markets react differently to issuances of both securities. While there is no 
significant market reaction to conventional bond issues, we observe a significant negative stock 
market reaction to sukuk issues.  
We attribute this different reaction of stock markets to the expectations of participants 
from two perspectives. On the one hand, investors expect that an adverse selection mechanism en-
courages less-healthy companies to prefer sukuk over conventional bond financing. Companies with 
low profit expectations have incentives to finance their project through sukuk as these instruments 
are based on profit-and-loss sharing schemes to allow them minimize their share in the loss. In con-
trast, companies with high profit expectations will opt for conventional bonds as it means a fixed 
repayment schedule and the maximization of their upside potential.  
On the other hand, investors may take the view that even if companies issuing sukuk may 
have been shut out of the conventional bond market, they can still take advantage of excess demand 
for sukuk from Islamic banks. Indeed, analysis of our sample found that companies issuing sukuk 
tended  to  be  in  weaker  financial  and  operating  situations  than  companies  issuing  conventional 
bonds. 
Our findings are relevant for two major debates in Islamic finance. First, Islamic finance is 
subject to criticism because its empirical application exhibits great similarity with conventional fi-
nance. Ayub (2007) observes that a major criticism of Islamic finance rests on the lack of differ-
ences with incumbent modes of finance. We provide countervailing evidence that stock markets are 
can readily distinguish between sukuk and conventional bonds. Thus, market-based information  
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supports the existence of differences between instruments emerging from Islamic finance and those 
associated with conventional finance. 
Regarding the economic effects of the expansion of Islamic finance, our results show that 
sukuk announcement likely leads to a negative market reaction that can adversely affecting firm 
value. In contrast, issuance of conventional bonds has a neutral impact on market capitalization. 
Therefore, the increasing use of sukuk as currently structured and sold may be detrimental to firm 
values, at least in the short run. 
As negative stock market reactions may limit incentives for companies to issue sukuk, 
market mechanisms are likely to curb the expansion of sukuk, despite the religious motivations. On 
the bright side, our results are related to the adverse selection mechanism that emerges from the co-
existence of sukuk and conventional bonds on the Malaysian market. Such a mechanism cannot ex-
ist if only sukuk are issued on an exchange, implying that the negative reaction to sukuk issues 
would be reduced in a pure Islamic financial system. In any case, before considering large-scale 
adoption of Islamic finance, additional research is needed to assess the long-run implications of su-
kuk financing in economic development.Christophe J. Godlewski, Rima Turk-Ariss and Laurent Weill 
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Table 1 
Total sukuk issues 2000-2007 
 
This table gives the value of sukuk issues in millions of US dollars for each year in the period 2000−2007. The figures are adapted from data 
provided by the Islamic Finance Information Services (IFIS). 
   2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Corporate sukuk  336.30  530.00  179.90  4,537.06  5,731.19  11,358.89  24,832.50  31,916.70 
% of total  100.00  67.95  18.36  79.36  79.48  94.14  90.65  82.69 
Sovereign sukuk  0.00  250.00  800.00  1,180.00  1,479.35  706.50  2,560.00  6,679.90 
% of total  0.00  32.05  81.64  20.64  20.52  5.86  9.35  17.31 










Descriptive statistics by bond type 
 
The table below provides the mean and standard deviation for several characteristics of the issues by bond type. All variables are in 
millions of Malaysian ringgit, with the exception of coupon and issue price (percent), maturity (years), and number of past issues. 
Amount issued is the original issue amount for the security. Amount outstanding is the current amount of the issue outstanding. Cou-
pon is the current interest rate of the security. Issue price is the price of the security at issue.  
 
Variable  N  Mean  Standard deviation 
Conventional bonds 
Amount issued  93  314.15  1,034.87 
Amount outstanding  93  208.37  304.87 
Coupon  93  3.79  3.13 
Issue price  51  99.17  4.14 
Maturity  82  6.51  11.69 
Sukuk 
Amount issued  77  96.00  160.73 
Amount outstanding  77  84.42  151.88 
Coupon  76  4.06  3.37 
Issue price  21  97.94  7.56 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics by issuer 
 
The table below provides the mean and standard deviation for issuer characteristics by bond type. All variables are in millions of 
ringgit, with the exception of financial ratios and number of past issues. Global amount outstanding is the debt distribution among 
outstanding for the current issuer only (excluding subsidiaries). Number of past issues is the number of securities used in calculation of 
debt distribution values for the issuer. 
 
Variable  N  Mean  Standard deviation 
Conventional bonds 
Total assets  47  4,719.99  10,772.23 
Total market value  47  4,558.93  12,121.02 
Sales  47  1,122.33  3,015.00 
Equity to total assets  47  40.60  20.41 
Total debt to total assets  47  32.16  15.39 
Long term debt to total assets  47  20.34  11.24 
Ebit to total interest expenses  43  3.60  5.63 
Current ratio  44  2.13  1.60 
Operating margin  47  13.60  17.36 
Return on assets  46  1.73  6.45 
Global amount outstanding  47  653.36  1,287.50 
Number of past issues  47  3.10  3.68 
Sukuk 
Total assets  30  3,057.78  5,437.40 
Total market value  29  2,944.87  5,507.26 
Sales  30  2,028.13  4,169.64 
Equity to total assets  30  19.70  119.42 
Total debt to total assets  30  52.62  96.67 
Long term debt to total assets  30  29.84  35.92 
Ebit to total interest expenses  29  3.27  5.87 
Current ratio  29  1.90  1.43 
Operating margin  30  -4.32  86.39 
Return on assets  28  -3.10  33.25 
Global amount outstanding  30  610.66  1,487.26 
Number of past issues  30  6.63  6.96 
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Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
This table displays cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) and standardized CAARs by type of event (sukuk vs. conventional 
bond announcement) in the third and fourth columns, and across five event windows. The percentage of positive CAARs is in the 
fifth column, while the last two columns provide p-values for t-tests of CAARs and Std. CAARs significance. *, **, *** denote signific-
ance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Event window  Type of  
announcement 
CAAR  Std. CAAR  Positive 
CAAR 
(%) 
Prob. > |t| 
for CAAR 
Prob. > |t| for 
Std. CAAR 
[0,0]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01426  0.34058  0.41860  0.46865  0.46057 
Sukuk  -0.00388  -0.09743  0.43421  0.28957  0.39266 
[-1,1]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01828  0.12773  0.44086  0.26698  0.57526 
Sukuk  -0.00858  -0.19963  0.42857  0.18531  0.15673 
[-2,2]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01904  0.14915  0.47312  0.29123  0.46663 
Sukuk  -0.01552**  -0.28522***  0.36364  0.01303  0.00812 
[-1,2]  Conventional 
bond 
0.01740  0.09836  0.46237  0.31130  0.63475 
Sukuk  -0.01319*  -0.25224*  0.38961  0.05976  0.05545 
[-2,1]  Conventional 
bond 
0.01991  0.17901  0.44086  0.22326  0.38247 
Sukuk  -0.01090*  -0.23953**  0.40260  0.05445  0.03319 
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Table 5 
Difference significance tests by event type 
for cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs 
by type of investment security event (sukuk vs. conventional bonds) across each of five event windows. For the first two tests, the 
null hypothesis is that the difference of CAARs (and standardized CAARs) between sukuk and conventional bond events is zero. For 
the Kruskal-Wallis test, the null hypothesis is that the sukuk and bond events samples come from identical populations. *, **, *** de-
note significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
    Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis test 
Event window    t  Prob. > |t|  Z  Prob. > |Z|  Chi²  Prob. > Chi² 
[0,0] 
CAAR  0.91  0.3650  -0.1091  0.4566  0.0123  0.9118 
Std. CAAR  0.93  0.3570  0.0990  0.4606  0.0101  0.9198 
[-1,1] 
CAAR  1.53  0.1293  -0.4696  0.3193  0.2220  0.6375 
Std. CAAR  1.23  0.2214  -0.1033  0.4589  0.0110  0.9165 
[-2,2] 
CAAR  1.82*  0.0708  -1.1489  0.1253  1.3235  0.2500 
Std. CAAR  1.89*  0.0605  -1.3304*  0.0917  1.7742  0.1829 
[-1,2]  CAAR  1.66*  0.0966  -0.767  0.2216  0.5906  0.4422 
Std. CAAR  1.44  0.1524  -0.5009  0.3082  0.2524  0.6154 
[-2,1]  CAAR  1.79*  0.0754  -1.2804  0.1002  1.6433  0.2022 
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Table 6 
Cumulative average abnormal returns – robustness check 
using different market models 
 
This table displays CAARs and standardized CAARs by type of event (sukuk vs. conventional bond announcement) in the third and 
fourth columns, and across five event windows. We use the FBEMAS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing conven-
tional bonds, and the FBMS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing sukuk. The percentage of positive CAARs is in 
the fifth column, while the last two columns provide p-values for t-tests of CAARs and Std. CAARs significance. *, **, *** denote signi-
ficance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
Event window  Type of an-
nouncement 
CAAR  Std. CAAR  Positive 
CAAR 
(%) 
Prob. > |t| 
for CAAR 
Prob. > |t| for 
Std. CAAR 
[0,0]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01426  0.34058  0.38710  0.46865  0.46057 
Sukuk  -0.00420  -0.11036  0.45455  0.25460  0.33673 
[-1,1]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01828  0.12773  0.44086  0.26698  0.57526 
Sukuk  -0.00828  -0.19885  0.46753  0.20898  0.16729 
[-2,2]  Conventional 
bonds 
0.01903  0.14915  0.47312  0.29123  0.46663 
Sukuk  -0.01442**  -0.27218**  0.36364  0.01900  0.01073 
[-1,2]  Conventional 
bond 
0.01740  0.09836  0.46237  0.31130  0.63475 
Sukuk  -0.01200*  -0.23871*  0.38961  0.09145  0.07296 
[-2,1]  Conventional 
bond 
0.01992  0.17901  0.44086  0.22326  0.38247 
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Table 7 
    Difference significance tests by event type for cumulative average abnormal returns – robustness check 
        using different market models 
 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs 
by  event (sukuk vs. conventional bonds) across each five event windows. For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the differ-
ence of CAARs (and standardized CAARs) between sukuk and conventional bond events is zero. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, the null 
hypothesis is that the sukuk and bond events samples come from identical populations. We use the FBEMAS index as a proxy of 
market return for companies issuing conventional bonds, and the FBMS index as a proxy of market return for companies issuing 
sukuk. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
    Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis test 
Event window    t  Prob. > |t|  Z  Prob. > |Z|  Chi²  Prob. > Chi² 
[0,0] 
CAAR  1.27  0.2071  0.2007  0.4205  0.0409  0.8397 
Std. CAAR  1.11  0.2689  -0.1817  0.4279  0.0336  0.8546 
[-1,1] 
CAAR  1.43  0.1550  -0.1534  0.4390  0.0240  0.8769 
Std. CAAR  1.40  0.1641  -0.2536  0.3999  0.0651  0.7986 
[-2,2] 
CAAR  1.77*  0.0796  -1.0143  0.1552  1.0319  0.3097 
Std. CAAR  1.84*  0.0680  -1.2240  0.1105  1.5020  0.2204 
[-1,2]  CAAR  1.59  0.1142  -0.5948  0.2760  0.3556  0.5509 
Std. CAAR  1.38  0.1702  -0.3788  0.3524  0.1447  0.7037 
[-2,1]  CAAR  1.78*  0.0771  -1.2553  0.1047  1.5797  0.2088 
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Difference significance tests by quality of sukuk issuer for cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
This table displays the results of Student, Wilcoxon and Kruskal-Wallis tests for the difference of CAARs and standardized CAARs 
for sukuk-issuing firms according to their quality measured with five financial variables (equity to total assets, total debt to total as-
sets, ebit to total interest expenses, current ratio, operating margin, and return on assets). We use the medians of these five ratios to 
split the sample into financially healthy and unhealthy issuers. The medians are respectively equal to 38.55%; 35.21%; 2.55%; 
1.65%; 11.23%; and 3.60%. We display the results for the event window [-2, 2]. For the first two tests, the null hypothesis is that the 
difference of CAARs (and standardized CAARs) between sukuk and conventional bond events is zero. For the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
the null hypothesis is that the sukuk and bond events samples come from identical populations. We use the FBEMAS index as a 
proxy of market return for companies issuing conventional bonds, and the FBMS index as a proxy of market return for companies 
issuing sukuk. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
      Student test  Wilcoxon test  Kruskal-Wallis test 
Variable  Event window   T  Prob. > |t|  Z  Prob. > |Z|  Chi²  Prob. > Chi² 
Equity to total  
assets  [-2,2] 
CAAR  -0.0176  0.9860  0.4078  0.6834  0.1749  0.6758 
  Std. CAAR  -0.1197  0.9055  0.2405  0.8100  0.0630  0.8019 
Total debt to total 
assets  [-2,2] 
CAAR  -0.7389  0.4637  -0.4863  0.6268  0.2466  0.6195 
  Std. CAAR  -0.7385  0.4640  -0.5897  0.5554  0.3601  0.5485 
Ebit to total inter-
est expenses  [-2,2] 
CAAR  -0.6089  0.5465  -0.2477  0.8044  0.0665  0.7964 
  Std. CAAR  -0.6070  0.5481  -0.1651  0.8689  0.0308  0.8608 
Current ratio 
[-2,2] 
CAAR  -0.0703  0.9443  0.8255  0.4091  0.6986  0.4033 
  Std. CAAR  0.0657  0.9479  0.9081  0.3639  0.8434  0.3584 
Operating margin 
[-2,2] 
CAAR  0.7710  0.4458  -1.6186  0.1055  2.6535  0.1033 
  Std. CAAR  0.3246  0.7476  -1.4124  0.1578  2.0242  0.1548 
Return on assets 
[-2,2] 
CAAR  -1.9062*  0.0634  -1.5272  0.1267  2.3639  0.1242 
  Std. CAAR  -1.8699*  0.0697  -1.7129*  0.0867  2.9695*  0.0848 
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Figure 1 
Number of issues per year from 2002 to 2009 on the Malaysian market 
 





Amounts issued per year from 2002 to 2009 on the Malaysian market 
 
This figure is based on data from the Bloomberg database. The breakdown distinguishes sukuk and conventional bonds. 
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Originator sells sukuk assets 
SPV pays for sukuk assets 
SPV leases back sukuk assets 
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